Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations
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Publication:964823
DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0420-6zbMath1202.91072OpenAlexW2083293720MaRDI QIDQ964823
Publication date: 21 April 2010
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0420-6
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