Ensuring a representative referendum outcome: the daunting task of setting the quorum right
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Publication:964825
DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0422-4zbMath1202.91068OpenAlexW1963765022MaRDI QIDQ964825
Publication date: 21 April 2010
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0422-4
Related Items (2)
Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness ⋮ Approval quorums dominate participation quorums
Cites Work
- The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables
- Ternary voting games
- Large Poisson games
- Another characterization of the majority rule.
- The voter who wasn't there: referenda, representation and abstention
- A new characterization of the majority rule
- Voting paradoxes and referenda
- How majorities can lose the election: another voting paradox
- Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
- On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
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