Informational control and organizational design

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2009.11.002zbMath1238.91091OpenAlexW2146279760MaRDI QIDQ969126

B. E. Eshmatov

Publication date: 11 May 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

communicationinformationcheap talk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (17)

Optimal sequential delegation ⋮ Strategic gradual learning and information transmission ⋮ Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors ⋮ A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space ⋮ Dynamic learning and strategic communication ⋮ Dynamic cheap talk with static informational control ⋮ Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk ⋮ Information control in reputational cheap talk ⋮ Communication with endogenous information acquisition ⋮ Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult ⋮ Optimal limited authority for principal ⋮ Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender ⋮ Ambiguous persuasion ⋮ Bayesian persuasion with costly messages ⋮ Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms ⋮ Cheap talk with private signal structures ⋮ Experimental design to persuade

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Naive audience and communication bias
• The optimal private information in single unit monopoly
• Information revelation in competitive markets
• Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• A Model of Expertise
• Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
• Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Optimal Delegation

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