Self-admissible sets
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Publication:969128
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2009.11.003zbMath1238.91035OpenAlexW2059624968MaRDI QIDQ969128
Amanda Friedenberg, Adam Brandenburger
Publication date: 11 May 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.11.003
weak dominanceadmissibilityepistemic game theoryiterated admissibilityperfect-information gamesself-admissible sets
Related Items (9)
The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology ⋮ Directed lexicographic rationalizability ⋮ Cautious belief and iterated admissibility ⋮ Iterated admissibility through forcing in strategic belief models ⋮ Comprehensive rationalizability ⋮ Changing types: information dynamics for qualitative type spaces ⋮ Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies ⋮ Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity ⋮ Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information
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