Sealed-bid auctions based on Cobb-Douglas utility function

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2009.05.019zbMath1203.91102OpenAlexW2012958835MaRDI QIDQ969466

Mingxi Wang, Shu-Lin Liu

Publication date: 7 May 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.05.019

zbMATH Keywords

bidding strategyexpected revenueCobb-Douglas utility functionfirst-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

IPV model with Cobb-Douglas and reference-dependent utility functions ⋮ Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit ⋮ A weighted product method for bidding strategies in multi-attribute auctions

Uses Software

• MADM

Cites Work

• Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Asymmetric Auctions