The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.026zbMath1203.91137OpenAlexW3124650993MaRDI QIDQ969480

Patrick W. Schmitz, Eva I. Hoppe

Publication date: 7 May 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.026

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionhidden informationinformation gathering

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (3)

Wholesale-price contract of supply chain with information gathering ⋮ Information provision before a contract is offered ⋮ On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries

Cites Work

• Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Optimal Auction Design

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