Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.029zbMath1203.91203OpenAlexW2049720373MaRDI QIDQ969481

Fuhito Kojima

Publication date: 7 May 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.029

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingimpossibility theoremnonbossiness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (6)

When preference misreporting is harm[lessful?] ⋮ Incompatibility between stability and consistency ⋮ Menu mechanisms ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ Influence in private-goods allocation

Cites Work

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• Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
• On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
• Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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