Co-ranking mates: assortative matching in marriage markets

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2009.11.013zbMath1203.91204OpenAlexW3121475549MaRDI QIDQ969493

Andrew Newman, Patrick Legros

Publication date: 7 May 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.11.013

zbMATH Keywords

nontransferable utilityassignment models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (6)

An exploration in school formation: income vs. ability ⋮ Unique stable matchings ⋮ Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility ⋮ A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem ⋮ Surplus efficiency of ex ante investments in matching markets with nontransferabilities ⋮ Weakening transferable utility: the case of non-intersecting Pareto curves

Cites Work

• On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
• Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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