Pure strategy Nash equilibria and the probabilistic prospects of Stackelberg players

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2009.10.012zbMath1203.91009OpenAlexW1965635860MaRDI QIDQ969506

William G. Stanford

Publication date: 7 May 2010

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2009.10.012

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic dominancepure strategy Nash equilibriumfinite Stackelberg gamesleader-follower preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (2)

Stackelberg equilibria via variational inequalities and projections ⋮ Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography

Cites Work

• Asymmetric probabilistic prospects of Stackelberg players
• Probabilistic prospects of Stackelberg leader and follower
• Limiting distributions of the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in \(n\)-person games
• Stochastic Dominance on Unidimensional Grids
• The Efficiency Analysis of Choices Involving Risk
• Unnamed Item

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