Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2009.12.003zbMath1207.68404OpenAlexW4213026902MaRDI QIDQ969531

Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer

Publication date: 7 May 2010

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2009.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designpayment redistributionVickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

Related Items (14)

Almost budget balanced mechanisms with scalar bids for allocation of a divisible good ⋮ Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget ⋮ Efficiency and Budget Balance ⋮ Greater flexibility in mechanism design through altruism ⋮ Structural properties of the optimal resource allocation policy for single-queue systems ⋮ Expressive markets for donating to charities ⋮ Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions ⋮ Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms ⋮ Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains ⋮ Optimal allocation of an indivisible good ⋮ Destroy to save ⋮ Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects ⋮ Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads ⋮ SBBA: A Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
• Fair imposition
• Destroy to save
• Incentives in Teams
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Undominated Groves Mechanisms
• Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions

This page was built for publication: Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms