Location equilibrium with asymmetric firms: the role of licensing
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Publication:969635
DOI10.1007/s00712-009-0104-9zbMath1229.91252OpenAlexW2052831402MaRDI QIDQ969635
Toshihiro Matsumura, Noriaki Matsushima, Giorgos Stamatopoulos
Publication date: 7 May 2010
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-009-0104-9
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Spatial models in economics (91B72) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)
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Cites Work
- Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
- On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
- Welfare reducing licensing.
- On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- Location choices under quality uncertainty
- Fee versus royalty reconsidered
- Cournot Competition Yields Spatial Agglomeration
- On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
- Technology transfer with commitment.
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