Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm
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Publication:969638
DOI10.1007/s00712-010-0108-5zbMath1229.91219OpenAlexW1978337189MaRDI QIDQ969638
Publication date: 7 May 2010
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.eeri.eu/documents/wp/EERI_RP_2009_25.pdf
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (2)
Stackelberg leadership with product differentiation and endogenous entry: some comparative static and limiting results ⋮ Leaders and competitors
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