The bargaining set of a large game
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Publication:971889
DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0433-xzbMath1203.91014OpenAlexW1967863885MaRDI QIDQ971889
Luigi Montrucchio, Massimiliano Amarante
Publication date: 17 May 2010
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0433-x
Lyapunov convexity theoremmarket gamesMas-Colell bargaining setcore-equivalencemaximal excess gamethin games
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Cites Work
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