Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms
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Publication:971893
DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0446-0zbMath1187.91010OpenAlexW2107784908MaRDI QIDQ971893
Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler, Burkhard C. Schipper, Albert Kolb
Publication date: 17 May 2010
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0446-0
learningexperimentsfictitious playinternetimitationCournot duopolyreinforcementstrategic teachingtrial \& error
Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Experimental studies (91A90) Internet topics (68M11)
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