Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.04.009zbMath1229.91123OpenAlexW3122743328MaRDI QIDQ972124

Glenn Ellison, Robert M. Anderson, Drew Fudenberg

Publication date: 25 May 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.009

zbMATH Keywords

nonstandard analysisagglomerationinteger constraintsquasi-equilibriumindivisibilitytwo-sided marketstippinglarge finite economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Cites Work

• Equilibria and core of large economies
• The rate of convergence of the core for a purely competitive sequence of economies
• Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?
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