How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures
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Publication:972131
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.002zbMath1229.91029OpenAlexW2122414948MaRDI QIDQ972131
Publication date: 25 May 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.002
Nash equilibriumcorrelated equilibriumcommunication complexityspeed of convergenceuncoupled dynamics
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44) Decision theory for games (91A35)
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