A commitment folk theorem
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Publication:972132
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.008zbMath1229.91031OpenAlexW1979675366MaRDI QIDQ972132
Ehud Lehrer, Ehud Kalai, Adam Tauman Kalai, Dov Samet
Publication date: 25 May 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.008
Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items (18)
Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games ⋮ Game theory with translucent players ⋮ Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination ⋮ Mediators in position auctions ⋮ Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure ⋮ Program equilibrium -- a program reasoning approach ⋮ Sequential commitment games ⋮ Private disclosure with multiple agents ⋮ Reciprocal contracting ⋮ A folk theorem for competing mechanisms ⋮ Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples ⋮ Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games ⋮ Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Jointly controlled lotteries with biased coins ⋮ Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability ⋮ Private communication in competing mechanism games ⋮ COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS ⋮ Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games
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