Simple collusive agreements in one-shot first-price auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.020zbMath1229.91146OpenAlexW2012272861MaRDI QIDQ972134

Yair Tauman, Gil Kivetz

Publication date: 25 May 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.020

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items

Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values, Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective, Collusion through communication in auctions, Commitment in first-price auctions, Bribing in second-price auctions, Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request

Cites Work

• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
• Collusion in one-shot second-price auctions
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently