Agreeing to disagree: the non-probabilistic case

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.032zbMath1229.91070OpenAlexW2036977054MaRDI QIDQ972137

Dov Samet

Publication date: 25 May 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.tau.ac.il/~samet/papers/generalized-agreement-theorem.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items

Learning to agree over large state spaces ⋮ ``Agreeing to disagree type results under ambiguity ⋮ Computing distributed knowledge as the greatest lower bound of knowledge ⋮ Counterfactuals in ``agreeing to disagree type results ⋮ Agreement theorems in dynamic-epistemic logic ⋮ The impossibility of agreeing to disagree: an extension of the sure-thing principle ⋮ PEOPLE WITH COMMON PRIORS CAN AGREE TO DISAGREE ⋮ Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance ⋮ Toward a theory of play: a logical perspective on games and interaction

Cites Work

• Learning to agree
• Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
• Agreeing to disagree
• Interactive epistemology. I: Knowledge
• Interactive epistemology. II: Probability
• S5 knowledge without partitions
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