All-stage strong correlated equilibrium

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.002zbMath1229.91030OpenAlexW2095955720MaRDI QIDQ972139

Yuval Heller

Publication date: 25 May 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15644/1/MPRA_paper_15644.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationnon-cooperative gamescommon knowledgestrong correlated equilibriumcoalition-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (1)

Committing to correlated strategies with multiple leaders

Cites Work

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• Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
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• Coalition-proof equilibrium
• Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
• Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality

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