A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions
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Publication:972140
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.11.006zbMath1229.91033OpenAlexW2120728934MaRDI QIDQ972140
Indrajit Ray, Roberto Serrano, Anirban Kar
Publication date: 25 May 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.006
Related Items (2)
Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games
Cites Work
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