The impossibility of effective enforcement mechanisms in collateralized credit markets

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.12.004zbMath1280.91071OpenAlexW2054098822MaRDI QIDQ972376

Thiago Revil T. Ferreira, Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez

Publication date: 25 May 2010

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.12.004

zbMATH Keywords

collateral guaranteeseffective default enforcementsindividual's optimality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Equilibrium with limited-recourse collateralized loans ⋮ Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties ⋮ Recourse loans and Ponzi schemes ⋮ On Ponzi schemes in infinite horizon collateralized economies with default penalties ⋮ Financial segmentation and collateralized debt in infinite-horizon economies

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Wealth transfers and the role of collateral when lifetimes are uncertain
• Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes
• A derivative-coderivative inclusion in second-order nonsmooth analysis
• General equilibrium in CLO markets
• Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1
• Stationary Equilibria in Asset-Pricing Models with Incomplete Markets and Collateral
• Collateral Avoids Ponzi Schemes in Incomplete Markets

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