Consistent extensions and subsolutions of the core of multi-choice NTU games
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Publication:972626
DOI10.1007/S10288-009-0099-7zbMath1186.91027OpenAlexW2019821617MaRDI QIDQ972626
Publication date: 21 May 2010
Published in: 4OR (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10288-009-0099-7
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