Fiscal policy under loose commitment

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.10.003zbMath1245.91061OpenAlexW1990849300MaRDI QIDQ972871

Davide Debortoli, Ricardo Nunes

Publication date: 21 May 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.10.003

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentfiscal policyno-commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (8)

Fiscal consolidation in a currency union: spending cuts vs. tax hikes ⋮ Escaping expectation traps: how much commitment is required? ⋮ The commitment value of funding pensions ⋮ Rules versus discretion in Central Bank communication ⋮ The value of monetary policy commitment under imperfect fiscal credibility ⋮ Imperfect credibility and robust monetary policy ⋮ An argument in favor of long terms for central bankers ⋮ On two notions of imperfect credibility in optimal monetary policies

Cites Work

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• The Japanese saving rate between 1960 and 2000: productivity, policy changes, and demographics
• Optimal taxation in an RBC model: A linear-quadratic approach
• Markov-perfect capital and labor taxes
• Projection methods for solving aggregate growth models
• A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
• Time-Consistent Public Policy
• Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives
• Models of Policy under Stochastic Replanning
• Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Solution

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