Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.010zbMath1245.91034OpenAlexW3121676470MaRDI QIDQ972876

Humberto Moreira, Aloisio Pessoa de Araujo

Publication date: 21 May 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.010

zbMATH Keywords

Spence-Mirrlees conditionglobal incentive compatibilitydiscrete poolingU-shaped condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (14)

A necessary optimality condition in two-dimensional screening ⋮ Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information ⋮ Method of digraphs for multi-dimensional screening ⋮ Complexity of solution structures in nonlinear pricing ⋮ Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result ⋮ Insurance contracts and financial markets ⋮ Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions ⋮ The marginal tariff approach without single-crossing ⋮ Job market signaling and employer learning ⋮ Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule ⋮ Pre-sale information ⋮ A Multi-Attribute Reverse Auction Model on Margin Bidding ⋮ An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection ⋮ Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models

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