The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms
From MaRDI portal
Publication:972878
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.009zbMath1245.91041OpenAlexW1965497940MaRDI QIDQ972878
Adam Chi Leung Wong, Artyom A. Shneyerov
Publication date: 21 May 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1467.pdf
Related Items (9)
FOR-PROFIT SEARCH PLATFORMS ⋮ Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: an inversion result ⋮ Price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty ⋮ Seller competition by mechanism design ⋮ A Walrasian Rubinstein and Wolinsky model ⋮ Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines ⋮ The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: can it be good for efficiency? ⋮ Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions ⋮ An optimistic search equilibrium
Cites Work
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Bargaining and efficiency in networks
- Prices, delay, and the dynamics of trade
- Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
- Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
- Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
- Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
- The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
- Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: A pairwise meetings market with private values.
- Bargaining, coalitions and competition
- Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information
- A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States
- Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings
- Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
- Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition
- The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
- Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
- Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
- Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding
- Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
- Existence and Convergence of Equilibria in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction
- Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism
- On the Trade off Between Deficit and Inefficiency and the Double Auction with a Fixed Transaction Fee
This page was built for publication: The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms
