Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions
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Publication:972879
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.006zbMath1245.91038OpenAlexW3124649661MaRDI QIDQ972879
Audrey Hu, Liang Zou, Steven A. Matthews
Publication date: 21 May 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/working-papers/09-016.pdf
Related Items (18)
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Cites Work
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- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Optimal Auction Design
- Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
- Precautionary Bidding in Auctions
- Optimal auctions revisited
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