Efficient assignment respecting priorities

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.007zbMath1245.91046OpenAlexW2032434317MaRDI QIDQ972883

Lars Ehlers, Aytek Erdil

Publication date: 21 May 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.007

zbMATH Keywords

consistencyefficiencyassignmentpriorities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (21)

Responsive affirmative action in school choice ⋮ An analysis of the German university admissions system ⋮ A market design approach to job rotation ⋮ Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement ⋮ Strategy-proof stochastic assignment ⋮ Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities ⋮ School choice with preference rank classes ⋮ Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems ⋮ A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list ⋮ Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand ⋮ Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities ⋮ The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach ⋮ Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations ⋮ Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities ⋮ Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility ⋮ Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand ⋮ Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities ⋮ On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms ⋮ Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities ⋮ Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities ⋮ Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties

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