Efficient assignment respecting priorities
From MaRDI portal
Publication:972883
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.007zbMath1245.91046OpenAlexW2032434317MaRDI QIDQ972883
Publication date: 21 May 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.007
Decision theory (91B06) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (21)
Responsive affirmative action in school choice ⋮ An analysis of the German university admissions system ⋮ A market design approach to job rotation ⋮ Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement ⋮ Strategy-proof stochastic assignment ⋮ Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities ⋮ School choice with preference rank classes ⋮ Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems ⋮ A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list ⋮ Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand ⋮ Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities ⋮ The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach ⋮ Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations ⋮ Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities ⋮ Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility ⋮ Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand ⋮ Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities ⋮ On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms ⋮ Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities ⋮ Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities ⋮ Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model
- Consistent house allocation
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- Hard variants of stable marriage.
- House allocation with existing tenants
- On cores and indivisibility
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Efficient priority rules
- School Choice with Consent*
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
This page was built for publication: Efficient assignment respecting priorities
