Information can wreck cooperation: a counterpoint to Kandori (1992)

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.040zbMath1203.91028OpenAlexW2139590513MaRDI QIDQ974182

Yuichiro Kamada, Scott Duke Kominers

Publication date: 27 May 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.040

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gameprisoner's dilemmaprivate monitoringcorrelated signal structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring ⋮ Some notes and comments on the efficient use of information in repeated games with Poisson signals

Cites Work

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• Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information