Bargaining over perfect complements owned separately: with experimental test

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.041zbMath1203.91107OpenAlexW2002728341WikidataQ59755941 ScholiaQ59755941MaRDI QIDQ974184

Ning Yu, Thorsten Chmura, Thomas Pitz, Ning Sun

Publication date: 27 May 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/33301/1/PubSub10817_Chmura.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

experimental economicsauction\(k + 1\)perfect complementsprice bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently

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