Efficient provision of a public project (almost) without knowing the cost-sharing rule

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.01.022zbMath1203.91071OpenAlexW2067536333MaRDI QIDQ974203

Yosef Mealem

Publication date: 27 May 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.01.022

zbMATH Keywords

symmetrypublic goodcost-sharing ruleefficient mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Implementation of individually rational social choice functions with guaranteed utilities

Cites Work

• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
• Public goods provision: Applying Jackson-Moulin mechanism for restricted agent characteristics
• Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information
• Subgame Perfect Implementation

This page was built for publication: Efficient provision of a public project (almost) without knowing the cost-sharing rule