Monotonicity and robustness of majority rule

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2010.02.013zbMath1206.91034OpenAlexW1968394675MaRDI QIDQ974229

Mariann Ollár

Publication date: 27 May 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.02.013

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicitymajority rulecontinuum number of votersdiverse domainwell-working

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences

Cites Work

• Nash implementable domains for the Borda count
• Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
• Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

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