Veto power in committees: An experimental study
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Publication:975367
DOI10.1007/S10683-010-9234-8zbMath1231.91056OpenAlexW2171315259MaRDI QIDQ975367
Eyal Winter, John H. Kagel, Hankyoung Sung
Publication date: 9 June 2010
Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-010-9234-8
Related Items (10)
Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining ⋮ Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments ⋮ Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework ⋮ Meaningful learning in weighted voting games: an experiment ⋮ A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining ⋮ Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments ⋮ Unanimous rules in the laboratory ⋮ Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence ⋮ Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: an experimental analysis
Cites Work
- Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
- A theory of sequential reciprocity
- Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
- Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
- Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining
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