Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance
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Publication:975372
DOI10.1007/S10683-010-9236-6zbMath1231.91057OpenAlexW2099447659MaRDI QIDQ975372
Anders U. Poulsen, Michael W. M. Roos
Publication date: 9 June 2010
Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://github.com/ueaeco/working-papers/raw/master/papers/afe/UEA-AFE-007.pdf
experimentbargainingcommitmentendogenous timingstrategic commitmentphysical timing effectsstrategic value of information
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Cites Work
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