A stability index for local effectivity functions

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.12.003zbMath1230.91020OpenAlexW2154326605MaRDI QIDQ975939

Joseph M. Abdou

Publication date: 11 June 2010

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

solvabilitycorestability indexsimple gamestrong Nash equilibriumeffectivity function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)

Related Items (2)

Stability and index of the meet game on a lattice ⋮ The structure of unstable power mechanisms

Cites Work

• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effectivity functions
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Strongly consistent game forms
• Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
• On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms.
• Exact stability and its applications to strong solvability
• Constitutional implementation.
• Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization
• Nash and strongly consistent two-player game forms
• Rectangularity and Tightness: A Normal Form Characterization of Perfect Information Extensive Game Forms
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