Impossibilities for roommate problems

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2010.02.003zbMath1230.91147OpenAlexW2093296756MaRDI QIDQ975947

İpek Özkal-Sanver

Publication date: 11 June 2010

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.02.003

zbMATH Keywords

consistencyconverse consistencyroommate problemscore extensions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (8)

Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice ⋮ A new solution concept for the roommate problem: \(\mathcal{Q}\)-stable matchings ⋮ Consistent enlargements of the core in roommate problems ⋮ Distance on matchings: An axiomatic approach ⋮ Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution ⋮ Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets ⋮ Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems ⋮ Consistency and its converse for roommate markets

Cites Work

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• Axiomatization of the core of assignment games
• A maximum stable matching for the roommates problem
• Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
• A note on gender fairness in matching problems.
• A polynomial-time algorithm for the bistable roommates problem
• Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems
• Random paths to \(P\)-stability in the roommate problem
• Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
• A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
• Approximation and Online Algorithms
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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