Monopolistic competition in electricity networks with resistance losses
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Publication:976766
DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0460-2zbMath1231.91114OpenAlexW2140738479MaRDI QIDQ976766
Juan F. Escobar, Alejandro Jofre
Publication date: 16 June 2010
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0460-2
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (12)
Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid electricity market Part 2 - best response of a producer ⋮ Analysis of M-stationary points to an EPEC modeling oligopolistic competition in an electricity spot market ⋮ Mechanism Design and Auctions for Electricity Networks ⋮ Games and teams with shared constraints ⋮ Pollution Regulation for Electricity Generators in a Transmission Network ⋮ Modelling network constrained economic dispatch problems ⋮ Value at risk approach to producer's best response in an electricity market with uncertain demand ⋮ Regularized Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints with Application to Energy Markets ⋮ On an equilibrium problem with complementarity constraints formulation of pay-as-clear electricity market with demand elasticity ⋮ Divide to conquer: decomposition methods for energy optimization ⋮ Deregulated electricity markets with thermal losses and production bounds: models and optimality conditions ⋮ A Short State of the Art on Multi-Leader-Follower Games
Cites Work
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- On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
- Spatial Oligopolistic Electricity Models with Cournot Generators and Regulated Transmission Prices
- Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
- A Comparison of Electricity Market Designs in Networks
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