On the probability of observing Borda's paradox

DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0415-3zbMath1230.91037OpenAlexW2051910119MaRDI QIDQ976964

William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley

Publication date: 16 June 2010

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0415-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report ⋮ Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules ⋮ Another perspective on Borda's paradox ⋮ Computations of volumes and Ehrhart series in four candidates elections ⋮ Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Probabilities of election outcomes with two parameters: the relative impact of unifying and polarizing candidates
• The unexpected behavior of plurality rule
• Positionalist voting functions
• The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
• The plurality majority converse under single peakedness
• The geometry of Black's single peakedness and related conditions
• On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
• Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
• Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
• The sensitivity of weight selection for scoring rules to profile proximity to single-peaked preferences
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Condorcet’s Paradox

This page was built for publication: On the probability of observing Borda's paradox