Demystifying the `metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion'
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Publication:976965
DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0424-2zbMath1230.91041OpenAlexW2052452987MaRDI QIDQ976965
Publication date: 16 June 2010
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96013
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