Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers

DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0427-zzbMath1230.91086OpenAlexW1965191056MaRDI QIDQ976966

Arunava Sen, Manipushpak Mitra

Publication date: 16 June 2010

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0427-z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (6)

Incentives and justice for sequencing problems ⋮ Balanced ranking mechanisms ⋮ Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines ⋮ Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems ⋮ Allocating positions fairly: auctions and Shapley value ⋮ Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem

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