On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions

DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0432-2zbMath1230.91040OpenAlexW1964875117MaRDI QIDQ976973

Issofa Moyouwou, Boniface Mbih, Xingyu Zhao

Publication date: 16 June 2010

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0432-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation ⋮ The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules

Cites Work

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• Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
• Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
• Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
• Equilibrium under @a-Majority Voting

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