Computational application of the mathematical theory of democracy to Arrow's impossibility theorem (how dictatorial are Arrow's dictators?)

DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0433-1zbMath1230.91043OpenAlexW2046015531MaRDI QIDQ976974

Andranick S. Tanguiane

Publication date: 16 June 2010

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0433-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

German parliamentary elections 2009 from the viewpoint of direct democracy

Cites Work

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• Arrow's paradox and mathematical theory of democracy
• Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
• Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• An Axiomatic Theory of Tournament Aggregation
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders

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