A dynamic model of a boundedly rational consumer with a simple least squared learning mechanism

DOI10.1007/s10614-010-9207-1zbMath1231.91292OpenAlexW2072644500MaRDI QIDQ976998

Ahmad K. Naimzada, Fabio Tramontana

Publication date: 16 June 2010

Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-010-9207-1

zbMATH Keywords

learningbounded rationalityendogenous preferencesstabilizing algorithm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (4)

Nonlinear Cournot oligopoly games with isoelastic demand function: the effects of different behavior rules ⋮ Endogenous reactivity in a dynamic model of consumer's choice ⋮ Should sophisticated expectations facilitate reaching equilibrium behavior? ⋮ Does local monopolistic approximation imply a less stable equilibrium?

Uses Software

• KELLEY

Cites Work

• Stability and instability in oligopoly
• Learning equilibria
• On the stability of best reply and gradient systems with applications to imperfectly competitive models
• Chaotic learning equilibria
• Comparative Statics for Oligopoly
• Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
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