Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs
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Publication:980952
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.006zbMath1230.91060OpenAlexW2166737235MaRDI QIDQ980952
Publication date: 8 July 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.006
Related Items (10)
Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation ⋮ Auctions with entry and resale ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Ranking equilibrium competition in auctions with participation costs ⋮ Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed ⋮ Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry ⋮ Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs ⋮ Informed entry in auctions ⋮ Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: comment ⋮ On stability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with uninformed bidders
Cites Work
- Participation constraints in the Vickrey auction
- Competitive bidding with entry costs
- Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
- Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
- First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge
- Auctions with entry
- Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs
- Coordination in auctions with entry
- Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
- Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
- Ranking auctions with risk adverse bidders
- Participation in auctions
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
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