Minority voting and long-term decisions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.008zbMath1230.91031OpenAlexW2093087465MaRDI QIDQ980960

Hans Gersbach, Theresa C. Fahrenberger

Publication date: 8 July 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.008

zbMATH Keywords

votingrisk aversionminoritydurable decisiontyranny of majority rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (3)

Preferences for harmony and minority voting ⋮ Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour ⋮ Balanced voting

Cites Work

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• Focal points in framed strategic forms
• Can we rationally learn to coordinate?
• Hidden symmetries and focal points
• Storable votes
• Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Rationalizing focal points

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