Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
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Publication:980965
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.004zbMath1230.91011OpenAlexW3121894050MaRDI QIDQ980965
Publication date: 8 July 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15643/2/MPRA_paper_15643.pdf
non-cooperative gamescorrelated equilibriumcheap-talkstrong equilibriumcoalition-proof equilibriumfault-tolerant distributed computation
Related Items (5)
Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ A detail-free mediator ⋮ Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information ⋮ All-stage strong correlated equilibrium ⋮ Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
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