Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.004zbMath1230.91011OpenAlexW3121894050MaRDI QIDQ980965

Yuval Heller

Publication date: 8 July 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15643/2/MPRA_paper_15643.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

non-cooperative gamescorrelated equilibriumcheap-talkstrong equilibriumcoalition-proof equilibriumfault-tolerant distributed computation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (5)

Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ A detail-free mediator ⋮ Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information ⋮ All-stage strong correlated equilibrium ⋮ Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap pre-play procedures
• Secure protocols of how communication generates correlation
• Coalition-proof correlated equilibrium: A definition
• Coalition-proof equilibrium
• Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
• Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
• Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations
• Non-cooperative games
• Universal Mechanisms
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• Distributed computing meets game theory
• Long Cheap Talk
• Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games
• Completely fair SFE and coalition-safe cheap talk

This page was built for publication: Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol