Leadership games with convex strategy sets

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.008zbMath1230.91022OpenAlexW2166294754WikidataQ57935139 ScholiaQ57935139MaRDI QIDQ980970

Bernhard von Stengel, Shmuel Zamir

Publication date: 8 July 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/27653/

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriumcommitmentfirst-mover advantageStackelberg gameleaderfollower

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

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• A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non‐constant‐sum game
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Constrained Games and Linear Programming

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