Costly network formation and regular equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.004zbMath1231.91041OpenAlexW3123018765MaRDI QIDQ980973

Francesco De Sinopoli, Carlos González Pimienta

Publication date: 8 July 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2009-05.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

stable setsnetwork-formation gamesregular equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items

Generic finiteness of outcome distributions for two-person game forms with three outcomes

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