A theory of hung juries and informative voting

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.12.003zbMath1230.91034OpenAlexW2121621444MaRDI QIDQ980975

Fuhito Kojima, Yuki Takagi

Publication date: 8 July 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.003

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (1)

Voting with public information

Cites Work

• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types

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