Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.012zbMath1230.91116OpenAlexW2024012076MaRDI QIDQ980977

Bernhard von Stengel

Publication date: 8 July 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/27651/

zbMATH Keywords

strategic complementsendogenous timingStackelbergCournotstrategic substitutesduopoly gameleaderfollower

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) 2-person games (91A05) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items

Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly ⋮ Endogenous price leadership with an essential input ⋮ INFINITE ASYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIA IN MIXED OLIGOPOLIES ⋮ Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly ⋮ Dominance hierarchies induce a population's full cooperation

Cites Work

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• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium
• Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
• Endogenous price leadership
• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
• Price Leadership
• DEMAND-INDUCED ENDOGENOUS PRICE LEADERSHIP

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